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NOTES 
THE NEW FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND 
EXPANDED ANTI-RETALIATION 
PROTECTIONS FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS 
CREATED BY SECTION 922 OF THE DODD-
FRANK ACT: ACTUAL PROGRESS OR JUST 
POLITICS? 
INTRODUCTION 
In early December 2008, Bernie Madoff was arrested for allegedly 
orchestrating a $50 billion Ponzi scheme.1 This news shocked everyone, 
and many wondered how a fraud of such magnitude could go without being 
detected for so long.2 In the days following Bernie Madoff’s arrest, the 
initial shock grew into anger as the public learned that the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC or the Agency) had been warned numerous 
times that Madoff was committing fraud.3 
One person in particular, Harry Markopolos, warned the SEC about 
Madoff five times.4 Markopolos, now an independent certified fraud 
examiner, first heard of Madoff while working at a rival firm.5 After 
conducting research on the trading strategy that Madoff claimed he used, 
Markopolos became convinced that Madoff’s returns were not real. In 2005, 
he sent a detailed letter to the SEC explaining why he thought “Madoff 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See United States v. Madoff, 586 F. Supp. 2d 240, 244, 244 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Ponzi 
Schemes – Frequently Asked Questions, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm (last visited 
Aug. 30, 2011). The SEC defines Ponzi scheme as:  
[A]n investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to existing 
investors from funds contributed by new investors. Ponzi scheme organizers often 
solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate 
high returns with little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the fraudsters focus on 
attracting new money to make promised payments to earlier-stage investors and to use 
for personal expenses, instead of engaging in any legitimate investment activity. 
Id. 
 2. See, e.g., Terry Keenan, This Ponzi Scheme is Crème de la Crème, N.Y. POST, Dec. 14, 
2008, at 35. 
 3. See, e.g., Amir Efrati, Tom Lauricella & Dionne Searcey, Top Broker Accused of $50 
Billion Fraud Sons Turned in Madoff After He Allegedly Told Them His Investment-Advisory 
Business for the Wealthy Was ‘Giant Ponzi Scheme,’ WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2008, at A.1. 
 4. Assessing the Madoff Ponzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enter. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
111th Cong. 5 (2009) [hereinafter Madoff Hearing] (statement of Harry Markopolos, CFA, CFE, 
Chartered Fin. Analyst and Certified Fraud Examiner). 
 5. See id. at 5, 27, 106–07.  
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Securities [was] the world’s largest Ponzi Scheme.”6 Four years later, on 
February 4, 2009, Markopolos testified before the Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises regarding the 
failure of the SEC to detect Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.7 During his testimony, 
Markopolos presented recommendations to correct the internal problems of 
the SEC.8 Additionally, he recommended the creation of “a whistleblower 
program to compensate people from within the industry who know about . . 
. fraud . . . to step forward.”9 
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act).10 
After years of being ignored, it seems that Markopolos’s advice was finally 
followed: Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act creates a financial incentive 
for persons to report fraud to the SEC.11 
Offering financial incentives for whistleblowers who aid the SEC in 
detecting corporate and securities fraud is not a new approach.12 Prior to the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC had a bounty program for 
informants who provided the SEC with tips regarding insider trading.13 That 
program was created pursuant to the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA), which was enacted in response to the 
publicity of several high-profile insider trading schemes.14 The Dodd-Frank 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Letter from Harry Markopolos, CFA, CFE, Chartered Fin. Analyst and Certified Fraud 
Examiner, to the SEC (Nov. 7, 2005), available at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer 
.aspx?fid=54539da2-994e-43b5-b271-19fbb7e723e3. 
 7. Madoff Hearing, supra note 4, at 5. 
 8. Id. at 5–8.  
  9. Id. at 42. 
 10. President Barack H. Obama, Remarks on Signing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act 
[hereinafter Remarks].  
 11. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841–49 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6 (2010)).  
 12. The SEC has had a reward program for insider trading informants since 1989. See 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 34-26994, 43 SEC DOCKET 1963, 1964 (June 30, 
1989) [hereinafter Applications for Bounty Awards]. Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 created anti-retaliation protections for employees of public companies who reported 
fraudulent activity by their employers to the SEC. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act), Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802–04 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002)). 
Lastly, many scholarly articles have called for additional incentives and protections for those who 
provide tips to the SEC and other agencies. See Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, 
Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2251 (Dec. 2010); Beverley H. 
Earle & Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of Whistleblower Protection Under Sarbanes-Oxley: A 
Proposal for Change, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2007); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Blowing the 
Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of Reform Versus Power, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 183, 
185–88 (2007). 
 13. See generally Applications for Bounty Awards, supra note 12 (discussing the bounty 
program). 
 14. See, e.g., Neil V. Shah, Note, Section 20A and the Struggle for Coherence, Meaning, and 
Fundamental Fairness in the Express Right of Action for Contemporaneous Insider Trading 
Liability, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 791, 791–92 (2009). 
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Act also expands the anti-retaliation protections for whistleblowers that 
were created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) which was enacted 
in response to several high-profile corporate frauds, including Enron,15 
WorldCom,16 and Tyco.17 
This note examines the SEC’s previous whistleblower reward program 
and the prior anti-retaliation protections offered by SOX, and argues that 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s financial incentives and anti-retaliation protections 
for whistleblowers do not address the SEC’s internal problems, and 
therefore, seem to be more of a political reaction than meaningful measures 
to increase the SEC’s ability to detect fraud. In Part I, this note will first 
discuss the role of whistleblowers in detecting corporate fraud. Then, Part II 
will examine the circumstances that led to the enactment of the ITSFEA, 
the specifics of the whistleblower program that it created at the SEC, and 
the outcome of this program. Next, the circumstances that led to the 
enactment of SOX, the specifics of the anti-retaliation protections created 
by SOX, and the effect of these protections will be explored in Part III. Part 
IV will analyze the circumstances that led to the enactment of the Dodd-
Frank Act, the specifics of the new whistleblower anti-retaliation 
protections, the financial incentives created by this law, and what the SEC 
is doing to implement the new program. Pulling together the information 
put forth in previous sections, Part V will highlight the trend of Congress 
and the SEC to reform the laws after a recession and revelation of high-
profile fraud. Part VI argues that the SEC was not lacking tips from 
whistleblowers, but rather it was the SEC’s internal problems that 
weakened its ability to detect fraud. Finally, Part VII suggests that instead 
of creating the new whistleblower program, the SEC should have focused 
on creating better internal procedures for reviewing external tips and 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Enron was an American energy trading company that engaged in accounting fraud. 
Enron’s accounting practices falsely inflated the company’s revenues by hiding large liabilities. 
When the company could no longer continue this practice, it was forced to file for Chapter 11. See 
Special Report: Corporate America’s Woes, Continued – Enron: One Year On, THE ECONOMIST, 
Nov. 30, 2002, at 69. Enron’s accounting scandal, in part, led to the enactment of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002. See, e.g., Lisa H. Nicholson, The Culture of Under-Enforcement: Buried 
Treasure, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Corporate Pirate, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 321, 321–25 
(2007). 
 16. WorldCom was a large American telecommunications firm that committed massive 
accounting fraud, causing the company to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on July 21, 2002. At the 
time, it was the largest bankruptcy in American history. WorldCom’s Bankruptcy Mess, THE 
ECONOMIST, July 22, 2002, at 1. WorldCom’s accounting scandal contributed to the decision to 
enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See, e.g., Nicholson, supra note 15, at 321–25.  
 17. Tyco’s Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer were both found guilty of 
“grand larceny and conspiracy, falsifying business records and violating general business law,” 
after being accused of using corporate funds for their personal use and misrepresenting the 
company’s financial situation. See Krysten Crawford, Ex-Tyco CEO Kozlowski Found Guilty: 
Second Trial Ends in Guilty Verdicts for Former Tyco Chief and the Company’s Ex-CFO Swartz, 
CNNMONEY.COM (June 21, 2005), http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/17/news/newsmakers/tyco 
_trialoutcome/index.htm. The Tyco scandal contributed to the government’s decision to enact the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See, e.g., Nicholson, supra note 15, at 321–25.  
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implementing technology that would make the Agency more proactive in 
detecting fraud. 
I. THE ROLE OF A WHISTLEBLOWER IN DETECTING 
CORPORATE AND SECURITIES FRAUD 
Corporate fraud often refers to schemes designed and carried out by 
corporate officers or employees in order to conceal the actual financial 
condition of the corporation from the public.18 Securities fraud includes 
schemes involving false or misleading information about securities and 
potential returns in order to attract investors.19 Both crimes cause harm to 
the individuals who are directly affected, and to society, since they diminish 
trust.20  
The deceptive and secretive nature of corporate and securities fraud 
makes them difficult to detect, especially for people who do not have access 
to a company’s internal files.21 Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, and Luigi 
Zingales conducted a study of 216 alleged fraud cases against U.S. 
corporations from 1996 to 2004,22 and “attribute[d] 34% of the fraud 
detections to internal governance . . . .”23 While internal governance 
detected more fraud than any other specific factor in the study, about 66% 
of cases were detected by those outside of the corporation—the SEC (7%), 
employees (17%), non-financial market regulatory organizations (13%), the 
media (13%), auditors (10%), equity holders (3%), and private parties who 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Reports & Publications, FBI, 2009 Financial Crimes Report (Oct. 1, 2008–Sept. 30, 2009),  
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/financial-crimes-report-2009/. 
 19. Id. Securities fraud is not limited to these schemes. Other types of securities fraud include 
insider trading, broker embezzlement, and late-day trading. Id.  
 20. See generally Nicholson, supra note 15, at 328–31 (discussing white-collar criminals). 
 21. See Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 12, at 2214.  
 22. Dyck, Morse, and Zingales relied on data collected by the Stanford Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse collection. This database includes all suits filed against U.S. firms for corporate 
fraud pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 between 
1996–2004. To exclude frivolous cases from the database, Dyck, Morse, and Zingales applied the 
following six filters: (1) they only included alleged frauds that ended after the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was enacted; (2) only large domestic firms were included; (3) they 
excluded all cases that were dismissed; (4) for cases that were settled, only those cases that were 
settled for more than $3 million were included; (5) for cases that were settled for more than $3 
million, those that seemed to be settled to avoid negative publicity were also eliminated; and (6) 
only frauds that involved firm management were included. As a result, the study included 216 
cases of alleged fraud. Id. at 2217–18. In order to determine who brought the claim, Dyck, Morse, 
and Zingales searched Factiva to collect and code data from articles. Id. at 2218–21. One bias that 
was noted was that early detected frauds were not included in the sample since this information 
was not publicly available. Id. at 2224. The main goal of the study, however, was to find “the most 
effective external mechanisms that help detect corporate fraud when there is a failure of internal 
mechanisms.” Id. The main finding of the study was that detecting fraud often depends on a “wide 
range of (often improbable) actors.” Id. at 2251. The study also found that the existing incentives 
for certain whistleblowers, such as employees, were weak. Id. Finally, the authors suggested that 
monetary incentives might have a significant role in promoting whistle-blowing. Id.  
 23. Id. at 2224–25 (“We identify a case as one of internal governance when the revealer of 
fraud is firm management . . . or the board of directors.”).  
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pursued litigation (3%).24 Therefore, the most important finding of their 
study25 is that in most cases, the detection of fraud occurs through “a 
complex web of market actors that complement each other.”26 The goal of 
whistleblower legislation has been to encourage information sharing across 
this “web,” particularly between insiders and the government. This has been 
done using a variety of mechanisms, including offering whistleblowers 
protection from retaliation and monetary incentives.27 
II. INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES FRAUD 
ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1988 (ITSFEA) 
The first program that offered financial incentives for informants to the 
SEC was created by the ITSFEA,28 and implemented by the SEC in 1989.29 
As discussed below, this statute was enacted in response to the increase of 
high-profile insider trading cases during the mid-1980s.30 As such, the 
program was limited to informants of insider trading.31 Although it seemed 
promising when it was first implemented, the program quickly became 
dormant.32 
A. CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO THE CREATION OF THE LAW 
The early 1980s were marked by a severe recession that caused 
economic uncertainty for many.33 In response to the recession, the White 
House and Congress enacted policies of deregulation with the hope of 
spurring the economy.34 Around the same time, however, several high-
profile insider trading scandals, including some involving White House 
administration officials and some of the most well-known men in the 
financial industry, came to light.35 Perhaps the biggest scandal of the decade 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. at 2214, 2225.  
 25. Id. at 2251.  
 26. Id.  
 27. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness 
of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 
1153 (2010). 
 28. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 3, 
102 Stat. 4677, 4679 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u–1 (1988)) amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 923(2)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1849–50 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.  
§ 78u–6 (2010)).  
 29. See Applications for Bounty Awards, supra note 12. 
 30. Thomas W. Joo, Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s, 
82 IND. L.J. 575, 583 (2007). 
 31. See Applications for Bounty Awards, supra note 12, at 1964–65.  
 32. See Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and 
Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1165 (1999); SEC, 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, No. 474, ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC’S BOUNTY PROGRAM 
(2010) [hereinafter ASSESSMENT]. 
 33. See Joo, supra note 30, at 576. 
 34. See id.  
 35. Id.  
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involved Ivan Boesky, “a world-class arbitrageur” who used insider 
information from Dennis Levine, a well-known merger specialist, to profit 
from corporate takeovers.36 These scandals caused many to believe that 
such behavior was commonplace.37 In response to the scandals, public 
anxiety about the economy, and perhaps to legitimize itself, Congress 
passed the ITSFEA.38 
B. THE ITSFEA AND THE SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FOR 
INSIDER TRADING 
The ITSFEA expanded the scope of the existing laws that regulated 
insider trading: Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 
Exchange Act), SEC Rule 10b-5,39 and the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 
1984.40 Through this new legislation, the SEC gained the authority to bring 
claims against controlling persons, create a bounty program for 
whistleblowers, and cooperate with foreign governmental authorities.41 The 
SEC’s authority to pay bounties to whistleblowers was codified by § 21A(e) 
of the Exchange Act.42 Under the new law, the SEC could pay a reward to 
“a person who provides information leading to the recovery of a civil 
penalty from an insider trader, from a person who tipped information to an 
insider trader, or from a person who directly or indirectly controlled an 
insider trader.”43 The SEC was also granted the sole discretion to determine 
whether to reward the whistleblower with a bounty.44 If the SEC decided to 
grant a reward, it could not “exceed 10 percent of the amount recovered 
from a civil penalty pursuant to a court order.”45 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Shah, supra note 14, at 797–98. It is rumored that the Gordon Gecko character in Oliver 
Stone’s movie Wall Street (Twentieth Century Fox 1987) was loosely based on Ivan Boesky. 
Randy James, Insider Trading, TIME.COM (Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/magazine 
/article/0,9171,1938727,00.html. 
 37. See, e.g., Poll Finds Majority Thinks Insider Trading is Common, WALL ST. J., June 6, 
1986, at 1. 
 38. Joo, supra note 30, at 583–84. 
 39. See Shah, supra note 14, at 793–95.  
 40. Joo, supra note 30, at 578–80. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act increased the penalty, 
from $10,000 to $100,000, that the SEC could receive under the Exchange Act. Id. at 578. 
 41. Shah, supra note 14, at 798–99. The law also created duties for broker-dealers and 
investment advisers to create programs to prevent insider trading. Additionally, criminal penalties 
were increased, and private rights of action for those who engaged in trades with insider traders 
were created. Id. 
 42. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 3, 
102 Stat. 4677, 4679 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u–1 (1988)) amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 923(2)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1849–50 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.  
§ 78u–6 (2010)).  
 43. ASSESSMENT, supra note 32, at ii. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id.  
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C. CRITIQUE OF THE SEC’S INSIDER TRADING BOUNTY PROGRAM 
After the insider trading bounty program went into effect, the SEC 
quickly received over twenty-five tips, several of which the “head of the 
SEC’s enforcement division [described as] . . . ‘helpful, extremely 
helpful.’”46 Within a couple of years, however, the optimism for the 
program declined, and in 1992, the SEC Enforcement Director William 
McLucas said that the program was unhelpful to SEC’s enforcement.47 He 
argued that although the SEC received “a lot of nut letters,” it did little to 
motivate true informants.48 To date, the SEC’s bounty program for 
whistleblowers reporting insider trading has paid out just under $1.2 million 
to six complainants, including a $1 million reward that was paid out in the 
summer of 2010, right after the Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law.49 
In its most recent review of the program, the Office of Inspector 
General of the SEC found that the Agency had received a small number of 
requests from those seeking a reward.50 Additionally, the program was 
unknown to many people, including SEC employees.51 The report also 
found that the program was not user-friendly, and the SEC did not have a 
uniform set of rules in place to determine when and in what amounts 
bounties should be given.52 Lastly, the report revealed that the SEC did not 
follow up with informants regarding their tips, and the files were often not 
complete and were typically not tracked within the office.53 Overall, the 
program was considered unsuccessful.54 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Ferziger & Currell, supra note 32, at 1165 (citing Gregory A. Robb, SEC Backs Rewards 
for Insider Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1989, at D1). 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
 49. ASSESSMENT, supra note 32, at 5 (discussing that $159,537 was paid through the SEC’s 
insider trading program from its inception until March 2010). Gil Rudawsky, SEC Pays 
Informants $1 Million in Insider-Trading Case, DAILYFINANCE.COM (July 23, 2010), 
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/07/23/sec-pays-informants-1-million-in-insider-trading-case/. 
The $1 million reward was paid in an insider trading case against Pequot Capital Management. 
The case was stalled until Glen Kaiser and Karen Kaiser provided the SEC with emails from 
Karen Kaiser’s ex-husband, David Zilkha. The emails implied that Zilkha, who was a Microsoft 
employee who later accepted a job at Pequot, was providing Arthur Samberg, the Chief Executive 
Officer of Pequot, with insider information about Microsoft. Samberg used information provided 
by Zilkha to benefit Pequot. The emails from Karen Kaiser provided the link that the SEC was 
missing. As a result, the case was settled by Pequot and Sambert for $17 million. Id. 
 50. ASSESSMENT, supra note 32, at 4. Interestingly, Ferziger and Currell point out that even 
without awarding bounties, the SEC still gets tips from informants. From 1985 to 1986, one-third 
of enforcement actions brought by the SEC were initiated by informants. Ferziger & Currell, 
supra note 32, at 1189. 
 51. ASSESSMENT, supra note 32, at 4. See also Ferziger & Currell, supra note 32, at 1161. 
 52. ASSESSMENT, supra note 32, at 4. 
 53. Id.  
 54. See id. See also Ferziger & Currell, supra note 32, at 1165. 
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III. THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 
Section 806 of SOX created anti-retaliation provisions for employees of 
a public company who report fraud to the SEC.55 As discussed below, SOX 
and § 806 came about after the corporate scandals of 2000 and 2001.56 The 
goal of § 806 was to encourage employees of public companies to report 
information pertaining to fraud to the SEC by offering anti-retaliation 
protections.57 Yet, some data shows that since SOX was enacted, the 
number of employees who reported fraud to the SEC actually decreased.58 
Additionally, many employee claims for retaliation under SOX failed.59 
A. CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO THE CREATION OF THE LAW 
During the mid-1990s, changes in communication and information 
technology contributed to a growing economy, especially in the “dot.com” 
industry.60 Nevertheless, “[s]tarting in the second quarter of 2000, the 
bubble burst,” and the market rapidly declined.61 As stock prices 
plummeted and the market unraveled, evidence of fraud at some well-
known public corporations was uncovered.62 
Perhaps the most shocking case of corporate fraud to be uncovered 
during this time occurred at Enron, “one of the fastest growing U.S. 
corporations of the 1990s.”63 Enron used fraudulent accounting practices to 
hide losses, and as a result, the stock price remained higher than it was 
worth.64 Finally, in the third quarter of 2001, Enron reported a $618 million 
loss,65 and by December 2001, the company filed for bankruptcy.66 As a 
result, all of Enron’s employees lost their jobs and savings, and investors 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802–04 (2002) (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002)), amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,  
§ 922(c)(1)(a)(i), 124 Stat. 1376, 1848 (2010) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.  
§ 1514A(b)(2)(D) (2010)).  
 56. Earle & Madek, supra note 12; Ramirez, supra note 12, at 196–97. 
 57. See Kevin Rubinstein, Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806: 
Balancing the Interests of Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 637, 638 (2007/08). 
 58. Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 12, at 2250. 
 59. See generally Earle & Madek, supra note 12, at 20 (discussing whistleblower protection). 
 60. William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Testimony before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing & Urban Affairs: Concerning Implementation of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (Sept. 
9, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/090903tswhd.htm [hereinafter 
Donaldson Testimony]. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Ramirez, supra note 12, at 196. 
 64. Letter purportedly from Enron employee Sharron Watkins sent to Enron Chairman and 
CEO Kenneth Lay regarding Enron accounting practices (Aug. 2001), available at 
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/empltr2lay82001.pdf. See also 
Leonard M. Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of Corporate Whistleblowers, the Duty 
of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 875, 875–76 
(2002). 
 65. Baynes, supra note 64, at 880.  
 66. Id.  
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lost large sums of money.67 Then, Sherron Watkins, an employee of Enron, 
testified at the congressional hearings about the fraudulent accounting 
practices used by the company and detailed the anonymous letter she wrote 
to Enron’s Chief Executive Officer, warning him of the fraud.68 Watkins 
became a national figure, and was named one of Time Magazine’s “Persons 
of the Year [for] 2002” for her courage to “blow the whistle.”69 
Within the next year, other large-scale corporate frauds came to light 
including those at WorldCom, Adelphia, and Tyco.70 As a result of these 
scandals, investor confidence decreased, and the markets dropped.71 As 
Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Associate Professor of Law at Washburn University 
School of Law, notes, “[b]y summer of 2002, the political and economic 
context as well as political and economic interests demanded action.”72 
Congress put its attention toward creating legislation to once again increase 
confidence in the financial markets by improving financial reporting and 
protections for whistleblowers.73 After receiving overwhelming support by 
Congress, President George W. Bush signed SOX into law on July 30, 
2002.74 
B. SOX AND § 806 WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS 
SOX is a comprehensive law that led to changes in corporate 
responsibility, enhanced financial disclosures,75 and “expanded criminal 
jurisdiction and penalties.”76 Additionally, § 806 bolstered protections for 
employees of public companies who blow the whistle on corporate fraud.77 
Pursuant to this section, an employer may not “discharge, demote, suspend, 
threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee in 
the terms and conditions of employment” because the employee provided 
the SEC with information that he reasonably thought to be fraudulent 
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 73. Earle & Madek, supra note 12, at 2–4. 
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 76. Ramirez, supra note 12, at 197. 
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behavior by the employer.78 Under § 806, an employee who was adversely 
treated by an employer only had “90 days after the date on which the 
violation occur[ed]” to “fil[e] a complaint with the Secretary of Labor.”79 
Since the law was enacted, the Department of Labor delegated the review of 
such claims to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA).80 If the claimant does not receive a decision within 180 days, he or 
she can bring the claim to a U.S. federal district court for de novo review.81 
The remedy for such action can include reinstatement, back pay with 
interest, and compensation for fees incurred because of the discrimination.82 
C. CRITIQUE OF § 806 OF SOX 
Initially, the whistleblower protections provided by § 806 of SOX were 
praised.83 Within three years, however, many were criticizing the law for 
not protecting whistleblowers as expected.84 In their study, Dyck, Morse, 
and Zingales noticed that after SOX was enacted, although there was an 
increase in fraud detection among auditors, as well as an increase in SEC 
interventions,85 the rate of whistle-blowing by employees dropped from 
18% to 13%.86 Furthermore, other studies found that very few of the 
employees who filed claims for retaliation with the Department of Labor 
had been successful.87 
There have been a few reasons given as to why SOX did not encourage 
or protect whistleblowers as expected.88 Some believe that the anti-
retaliation measures did not provide a strong enough incentive for people to 
report fraud and risk their careers.89 Others have argued that the procedural 
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 80. Secretary’s Order 5-2002; Delegation of Authority and Assignment of Responsibility to 
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Whistleblower Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 241, 250–51 
(2009). 
 85. Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 12, at 2249–50.  
 86. Id. at 2250.  
 87. See Moberly, supra note 83, at 90–100; Earle & Madek, supra note 12, at 20–23. 
 88. See Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 12, at 2250–51 (suggesting that anti-retaliation 
provisions of SOX should be enhanced by including financial incentives); Kim, supra note 84, at 
251 (arguing that the ninety-day statute of limitations to bring an anti-retaliation claim was not a 
long enough timeframe); Ramirez, supra note 12, at 211 (noting that “[p]ractitioners observe that 
both the investigators and supervisors lack disposition, training, and experience to adequately 
assess [SOX] claims because they are outside their area of competence”). 
 89. Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 12, at 2250–51.  
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requirements for anti-retaliation claims—especially the ninety-day statute 
of limitations—were too stringent.90 Finally, some believe that OSHA’s 
inexperience in assessing securities fraud claims91 made the process long 
and at times, wasteful.92 Overall, § 806 of SOX has not received good 
reviews. 
IV. THE DODD-FRANK ACT OF 2010 
A. CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING UP TO THE NEW LAW 
Beginning in 2001, extremely low mortgage rates led to a “record-
setting level of home sales,” and there was a general improvement in the 
economy.93 By 2005, the housing market was still strong, but signs of an 
impending decline in the market were starting to surface.94 During the 
second half of 2006, and throughout 2007, foreclosure rates soared.95 Many 
of these foreclosures were on subprime mortgages,96 which had been 
repackaged into mortgage-backed securities,97 causing the problem to 
spread to the financial sector and credit markets.98 As a result, Lehman 
Brothers and American International Group, two of Wall Street’s best 
known and oldest institutions, went bankrupt in September 2008.99 Upon 
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modified July 23, 2010). 
 98. See Housing Woes Take Bigger Toll on Economy than Expected: Paulson, AFP (Oct. 16, 
2007), http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hWSjWmGJ4YXTh3PM5kOC7csTT48g. 
 99. See Robert Gavin, Historic Bailout, Looming Questions; Can America Afford It? Some See 
Cost Over $1 Trillion; Others Predict Much Less, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 21, 2008, at A.1. 
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learning of these bankruptcies, other financial firms became weary of 
lending to one another, bringing the credit markets to a near halt.100 To get 
the credit and financial markets back to normal, the federal government 
bought around $700 billion of the troubled mortgage securities.101 
Like the recessions previously mentioned, during this most recent 
recession, many frauds were revealed.102 Bernie Madoff was arrested on 
December 11, 2008,103 a day after he confessed to his sons that he had been 
running a massive Ponzi scheme for years.104 Six months later, Allen 
Stanford, a well-known Texas financier, was also arrested for allegedly 
running an $8 billion fraud that consisted of selling certificates of deposit 
through his Antiguan bank.105 Investors were told that their money was 
placed in financial instruments monitored by twenty analysts and audited by 
the Antiguan regulators; however, the money was put in a portfolio that was 
managed by Stanford and the Chief Financial Officer of the company.106 
The portfolio invested mainly in private equity and real estate.107 
When people began to feel the effects of the subprime mortgage crisis 
throughout the country, and news of these frauds spread, the American 
public was once again anxious and angry.108 Congress held hearings 
regarding the financial crisis109 and Madoff’s Ponzi scheme,110 as many 
called for reform of the financial markets and the SEC.111 As a result, the 
Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010, 
with the intent of providing financial stability to the capital markets.112 
B. THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND § 922 WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS 
Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act expands the previous whistleblower 
protections and incentives for those who report corporate or securities fraud 
to the SEC.113 Under the new law, whistleblowers who provide the SEC 
with “original information” that leads to a recovery exceeding $1 million 
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can receive a reward of 10–30 percent of the recovery.114 The law defines 
“original information” as information that:  
(A) is derived from the independent knowledge or analysis of a 
whistleblower; (B) is not known to the [SEC] from any other source, 
unless the whistleblower is the original source of the information; and (C) 
is not exclusively derived from an allegation made in a judicial or 
administrative hearing, in a governmental report, hearing, audit, or 
investigation, or from the news media, unless the whistleblower is a 
source of the information.115  
The SEC has the sole discretion of how much the whistleblower should 
receive116 depending on the information provided,117 the degree of help 
provided by the whistleblower,118 the SEC’s interest in deterring violations 
of securities law,119 and any other relevant information the SEC decides to 
establish.120 A whistleblower may appeal the SEC’s decision to not grant an 
award to a U.S. court of appeals within thirty days after the SEC issues its 
decision.121 
If the whistleblower anonymously submits information and 
anonymously makes a claim for a reward, he or she must be represented by 
an attorney.122 Before the reward is given, however, a whistleblower must 
disclose his identity and any other information necessary to the SEC.123 All 
rewards will be paid from the Investor Protection Fund,124 which has been 
established in the U.S. Treasury.125 
In addition to the financial incentives, the new law also strengthens the 
anti-retaliation provisions of SOX.126 An employee who believes he or she 
has been retaliated against can bring the suit straight to a U.S. district 
court.127 Additionally, the statute of limitations to bring a claim is now six 
years from the date of the violation,128 or three years after the employee 
knew or should have known the material facts relating to the violation.129 
Any member of the SEC, a relevant regulatory agency, the Department 
of Justice, a self-regulatory organization, the Public Company Accounting 
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Oversight Board, or a law enforcement organization is not eligible for the 
reward.130 Additionally, a person who is convicted of a crime in relation to 
the tip given is ineligible for a reward.131 Furthermore, a whistleblower who 
knowingly and willfully provides false information to the SEC will not 
receive the reward.132 
Finally, the new law also requires the SEC to submit a report to the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the House 
of Representatives Committee on Financial Services regarding the 
whistleblower program.133 The report must include how many awards were 
granted and the types of cases for which the awards were granted for each 
year,134 among other disclosures.135 As a result of the new whistleblower 
provisions, the insider trading bounty program has been rescinded.136 
V. REACTIVE ENFORCEMENT  
As demonstrated above, the pattern seems to be that when a recession 
occurs, fraud is uncovered,137 which costs investors and angers the general 
public.138 Reform is usually demanded, and Congress answers with more 
legislation,139 which has included programs to incentivize and protect 
whistleblowers of insider trading and corporate and securities fraud.140 
When the market improves, however, the government and regulators seem 
to become more complacent and often fail at protecting investors.141 Adam 
Pritchard, Professor at the University of Michigan Law School, has noted 
that “[t]his political cycling between policies of benign neglect and 
hysterical overreaction suggests that the SEC, far from serving as a shelter 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Id. § 922(c)(2)(A). 
 131. Id. § 922(c)(2)(B). 
 132. Id. § 922(c)(2)(D). 
 133. Id. § 922(g)(5).  
 134. Id. § 922(g)(5)(A). 
 135. The report must also include information regarding the Investor Protection Fund, created 
by the Dodd-Frank Act and used to fund the activities of the Inspector General of the SEC and pay 
out whistleblower rewards. Id. § 922(g)(5)(B)–(G). 
 136. Rescission of Rules Pertaining to the Payment of Bounties for Information Leading to the 
Recovery of Civil Penalties for Insider Trading, 75 Fed. Reg. 57,384 (Sept. 21, 2010) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
 137. See A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time For Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 
1078 (2005); see also Madoff Hearing, supra note 4, at 2. 
 138. See Pritchard, supra note 137, at 1078. See also Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory 
Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 
10–11 (2002). 
 139. See Pritchard, supra note 137, at 1078; see also Ribstein, supra note 138, at 11. 
 140. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704,  
§ 3, 102 Stat. 4677, 4679 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u–1 (1988)) amended by Dodd-Frank Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 923(2)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1849–50 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 78u–6 (2010)); Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802–04 
(2002) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002)).  
 141. See Pritchard, supra note 137, at 1078. 
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against the vagaries of the political winds, acts more like a weathervane, 
swinging wildly with change in the political atmosphere.”142 
Pritchard believes that the SEC, because of its status as an independent 
agency, is very susceptible “to the political whims of [Congress],” leading 
to less effective policies.143 Additionally, both Stephen Choi, Professor of 
Law at New York University Law School, and Pritchard note that reactive 
regulation is not only subjected to political opportunism, but is also subject 
to “[a]vailability and [h]indsight [b]iases.”144 In other words, both Congress 
and the SEC rely too heavily on recent events, and “place too much weight 
on the probability of past events that actually occurred relative to those that 
did not.”145 Therefore, legislating in reaction to a crisis is not the ideal.146 
Reactive legislation leads to ineffective, and at times, costly policy 
changes.147 
VI. WERE THE NEW FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND EXPANDED 
ANTI-RETALIATION PROTECTIONS FOR 
WHISTLEBLOWERS NECESSARY? 
The new whistleblower provisions are very broad, but it seems that 
Congress has incorporated into the law what many believed was lacking in 
the prior programs.148 First, the new program offers a large financial 
incentive for any type of corporate or securities fraud reported that leads to 
at least a $1 million fine.149 This is an expansion of the insider trading 
bounty program and requires that the minimum reward be 10 percent of the 
recovery,150 as compared to the previous maximum of 10 percent.151 
Additionally, the new anti-retaliation provisions include a longer statute of 
limitations, which can now be filed directly in federal court, rather than 
with OSHA.152 Because of the increase in incentive to report and protection 
after reporting, the SEC has reported that many tips have already been 
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received.153 Therefore, the new whistleblower provisions seem to address 
the criticism that previous laws were not broad enough. But were they 
actually necessary? 
It has been suggested that previous whistleblower laws did not offer 
enough incentives and anti-retaliation protections for people to come 
forward with information.154 Yet, prior to the passage of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, it was not unusual for the SEC to receive about 1,000 tips from 
informants per day.155 Although many of these tips were frivolous, some 
were not. People were willing to report fraud without financial incentives 
from the SEC.156 Specifically, Markopolos gave a twenty-one page detailed 
account of why Madoff was likely conducting a Ponzi scheme.157 He said 
that he gave the SEC all they needed to know, but the Agency ignored 
him.158 Although Markopolos’s information spurred an investigation, the 
SEC investigators concluded that Madoff’s business was legitimate.159 
Likewise, the SEC had leads regarding Stanford’s Ponzi scheme, but did 
not investigate them thoroughly.160 Therefore, it seems like the failure to 
catch these frauds did not lie with the lack of tips received by the SEC, but 
rather with the SEC itself.161 
A. PROBLEMS WITHIN THE SEC 
Over the past few years there have been articles written describing 
internal problems of the SEC that hinder its ability to detect fraud.162 Some 
believe that the SEC is too influenced by the financial industry. 163 Others 
believe that the SEC failed to detect fraud because it was lacking good 
procedures and experienced investigators.164 Yet some, including the SEC 
itself, believe that the Agency’s failures are due to underfunding and 
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understaffing.165 Finally, others believe that the SEC’s lack of technology 
for reviewing all the data it receives has contributed to its inability to detect 
fraud.166 
1. Regulatory Capture 
Regulatory capture occurs when a regulatory agency that was created to 
act in the public’s interest begins to act in ways that are more beneficial to 
the industry it is supposed to be regulating.167 Despite being an independent 
agency, there is evidence that the SEC has been influenced by industry 
lobbyists, especially during a bull market.168 Pritchard argues that this 
influence has led to regulations which benefit the bigger players and names 
in the securities markets.169 In addition to being influenced by the industry 
through the political process, there has been a revolving door between the 
Agency and the private sector, as many people who worked for the SEC 
have left to work in the private financial industry.170 
Evidence of this regulatory capture can be seen in both the Madoff and 
Stanford cases. There have been suggestions that the SEC did not 
thoroughly investigate Madoff because of his prominence in the industry.171 
Additionally, the SEC’s Inspector General’s report on Stanford revealed 
that although examiners found red flags and suggested opening an 
investigation, top officials decided to stop investigating Stanford on 
numerous occasions.172 A head enforcement agent that was instrumental in 
those decisions later left the Agency and tried to represent Stanford three 
times.173 Therefore, it seems that interactions between the SEC’s employees 
and those in the private financial sector can at times inhibit the Agency’s 
ability to detect fraud. 
2. Procedural and Policy Problems 
Prior to the SEC reforms that began in early 2010, the SEC did not have 
a streamlined system in place for receiving and investigating tips.174 
Because of this disarrayed system and the increasing number of tips the 
Agency was receiving, it was harder for the Agency to distinguish the 
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legitimate from the frivolous.175 Furthermore, the SEC had a policy that 
evaluated the enforcement division by the number of cases it filed rather 
than the quality and complexity of the fraud it detected.176 
When the SEC’s Inspector General conducted an investigation of the 
SEC’s Division of Enforcement and its failure to detect Madoff’s Ponzi 
scheme, it found many systematic issues related to the lack of guidance on 
how to properly and completely analyze tips.177 Additionally, the Inspector 
General’s report on Stanford found that top SEC officials in the Agency’s 
Fort Worth office often avoided complex cases, like Stanford, and instead 
focused on smaller and easier cases.178 This was done to improve their 
“stats” since the heads of the Agency in Washington judged the regional 
offices by the number of cases brought.179 As a result, the Agency’s lack of 
review procedures for tips, as well as its focus on the quantity rather than 
the complexity of cases, has played a role in its failure to detect the Madoff 
and Stanford frauds. 
3. Lack of Experienced Employees Who Understand Capital 
Markets 
The SEC has been criticized for being dominated by lawyers.180 
Although lawyers are necessary to interpret and enforce securities laws and 
the SEC rules, lawyers tend to be bad managers.181 Poor management was 
one of the reasons that the SEC failed to detect Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.182 
Additionally, lawyers often do not have a strong financial industry 
background.183 As financial instruments become more complex, so does 
investigating for fraud; therefore, those with expertise in the financial 
markets might prove to be better at fraud detection.184 Furthermore, in his 
report regarding the SEC’s failure to uncover Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, the 
SEC’s Inspector General noted that the SEC’s examinations of Madoff’s 
business were often conducted by teams of inexperienced staff members.185 
Specifically, the report says that the inexperienced staff during one 
examination “failed to appreciate the significance of the evidence in 
[Markopolos’s] complaint,” and they were “confused about certain critical 
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and fundamental aspects of Madoff’s operation.”186 It will be very difficult, 
and even impossible, for people to detect fraud if they do not have a basic 
understanding of the business models and industry that they are 
investigating.187 
4. Understaffed and Underfunded 
Another problem, usually cited by the SEC, is that the Agency has been 
understaffed and underfunded.188 Some refute this argument noting that the 
SEC’s budget has tripled between 2000 and 2010, and yet its problems 
remain.189 Without enough financial resources, the SEC cannot hire as 
many people as necessary to regulate the growing financial industry.190 
Additionally, it has trouble retaining more experienced people, as many of 
its employees often leave to go work in the private sector where the salaries 
are better.191 
5. Lack of Technology 
The SEC collects a great amount of disclosure data from companies in 
order to make sure the companies are complying with the law and not 
defrauding investors.192 While the amount of information received by the 
SEC has increased in recent years, the Agency’s information technology 
has not improved to meet the Agency’s needs.193 Although many in the 
private sector use risk-monitoring software to screen documents for errors, 
note year-to-year changes, and calculate important financial ratios, the SEC 
employs many people to review documents manually.194 This is a timely 
procedure, and as a result, the SEC does not have the ability to do an 
industry-wide data analysis.195 Accordingly, the SEC has become reliant on 
external sources such as tips, complaints, and news stories.196 As mentioned 
above, however, the process for reviewing tips has also been problematic.197 
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B. DO THE NEW WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS ADDRESS THE 
AFOREMENTIONED PROBLEMS? 
It seems that the reason the SEC was unable to detect Madoff’s and 
Stanford’s Ponzi schemes was due to policy and operations problems within 
the Agency, and not because the Agency lacked information and tips 
regarding the fraud. The SEC was already undergoing internal reforms, 
setting better procedures for investigating tips, and training employees.198 
Why then, would the SEC and Congress create a whistleblower program 
that offers very high financial incentives and anti-retaliation protections? It 
seems that it might have been another instance of Congress feeling that it 
must do something in the face of public anger.199 
Although the new financial incentives may increase the number of tips 
the SEC receives,200 there is no guarantee that they will receive quality 
information.201 The increase in tips may overwhelm the SEC, as more 
resources will have to be expended on sifting through the increasing 
number of claims and trying to determine which are legitimate.202 Also, 
before the financial incentives were offered, those who reviewed tips in the 
Agency were sometimes skeptical of the information.203 Now that there are 
financial incentives, this skepticism may heighten. As has happened in the 
past at the SEC, more tips may prove to be a burden rather than helpful 
information.204 
VII. A MORE PRUDENT AND PROACTIVE APPROACH 
Reforms were undoubtedly needed within the SEC’s Division of 
Enforcement, especially in relation to the investigation of whistleblower 
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complaints.205 Yet, rather than creating large financial incentives and anti-
retaliation provisions for whistleblowers, the SEC should have focused on 
making smaller, internal changes. Additionally, the SEC should consider 
taking a more proactive approach by enhancing its information technology, 
creating a database of all the information it receives from companies, and 
conducting industry-wide data analyses rather than increasing its reliance 
on whistleblowers to provide the Agency with leads.206 
A. PRUDENT REFORMS REGARDING WHISTLEBLOWER TIPS 
The SEC recognized the need to make internal changes before the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.207 In January 2010, the Agency announced 
it would be creating an Office of Market Inspection within the Division of 
Enforcement, which would deal solely with investigating the hundreds of 
thousands of tips the Agency receives each year.208 Perhaps it would have 
been better to give the SEC time to get the new office and procedures in 
place before offering financial incentives that could greatly increase the 
amount of tips received. 
Furthermore, the SEC should have been given the power to pay 
bounties to whistleblowers who provide information that leads to successful 
enforcement. Rather than creating a new mandatory payment of 10–30 
percent of a settlement, perhaps the Insider Trading Bounty Program, which 
gave the SEC discretion to reward an informant up to 10 percent of a 
settlement,209 could have been extended to all informants. Although this 
program has been considered a failure, its failure seemed to be due to the 
fact that very few people knew about it and that the SEC rarely rewarded 
informants.210 Therefore, the SEC could address these problems by 
publicizing the reward program and rewarding informants when they 
provided helpful information. Additionally, requiring an annual report on 
the program from the SEC to congressional committees, as the Dodd-Frank 
Act does, 211 is a good way for Congress to make sure that the program is 
being utilized.  
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Moreover, the SEC’s Division of Enforcement should try to attract 
employees who are experienced with investigating securities fraud,212 and 
who have knowledge of the capital markets.213 Competitive salaries will 
help attract employees of high caliber, and may even help close the 
revolving door between the Agency and the financial industry.214 This 
would make the Agency more independent and less susceptible to industry 
capture.215 Likewise, the Agency should offer incentive bonuses to those in 
the Division of Enforcement when they are instrumental in detecting fraud 
and getting a settlement.216 
B. A MORE PROACTIVE APPROACH 
While whistleblowers undoubtedly play an important part in detecting 
fraud,217 the SEC should not become too reliant on tips from outsiders.218 
The Agency should try to implement more proactive measures for detecting 
fraud.219 The SEC should update its information technology and streamline 
its systems so that all of the regional offices have access to the same 
information.220 Additionally, the SEC should use software to scan 
documents for errors and create a database for all the information they 
receive, which would give them the ability to do industry-wide data 
analyses.221 Although technology is not infallible, having these systems in 
place would make the review process quicker and better enable the SEC to 
detect trends and anomalies in the market.222 The Agency should also create 
risk profiles based on the elements that previous schemes had in 
common.223 These technological updates may lessen the SEC’s need to rely 
on outside informants.224 Even if these changes do not lessen the SEC’s 
reliance on tips, these technological enhancements will still be beneficial 
because the data they produce can help the Agency prioritize and review 
tips that it receives.225 
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CONCLUSION 
The new whistleblower provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act offer great 
financial incentives and anti-retaliation protections to those who provide 
tips about corporate and securities fraud to the SEC. Although the new law 
sounds good in theory, it might have been unnecessary. The SEC missed 
Madoff’s fraud not because it did not receive enough tips, but rather 
because they failed to properly investigate the tips they did receive. 
Therefore, a law that can potentially lead to a great increase in claims, many 
of which might be frivolous, will only make the SEC’s task more onerous. 
A more prudent reform that focused on improving the SEC’s internal 
procedures and technology for reviewing tips would have been a better 
approach. Improving internal procedures and technology will not only help 
the SEC review tips, but will also enable the Agency to become less 
dependent on informants and more proactive and independent in detecting 
fraud. 
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